Server Side Approaches to Clickjacking Detection.pdf

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Server-side approaches to
clickjacking detection
Brad Hill, PayPal
WebAppSec WG F2F, 3 April 2012
Drawbacks of X-Frame-Options
IFRAMES desirable for many key clickjacking
attack cases. (Like, Pay, Follow, +1) Users
want in-context information without
disclosure to embedding origin
Allow-From doesn’t help – adversary is
potentially the same as the “legitimate” origin
Also doesn’t stop pop-under-and-close attacks
Drawbacks of client-enforced
screenshot approach
Incomplete coverage of attack scenarios
Fake mouse cursor, attention stealing attacks
False positives
User-interaction to resolve false positives
Low deployment rates
Server side approaches?
What can we do today without user-agent
support?
Can we profitably combine these techniques
with user-agent mechanisms?
Adaptive UI Randomization
Clickjacking attacks are still subject to the read
restrictions of the same-origin policy
Attack setup relies on a consistent layout of
the victim page
What if we randomize the location of the
button?
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