Osprey - Fortress 023 - German Field Fortifications 1939-1945.pdf

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GERMAN FIELD
FORTIFICATIONS
1939–45
GORDON L ROTTMAN
ILLUSTRATED BY IAN PALMER
© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
FORTRESS • 23
GERMAN FIELD
FORTIFICATIONS
1939–45
GORDON L ROTTMAN
ILLUSTRATED BY IAN PALMER
Series editor
Marcus Cowper and Nikolai Bogdanovic
© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
Contents
Introduction
German tactical defence doctrine
‘Elastic defence’ • Mobile warfare • The principles of unit defence
4
5
10
Planning the defences
Establishing a defended area • The strongpoint concept, December 1941
Hedgerow defences, Normandy 1944
Defensive firepower
The infantry regiment • Machine guns • Infantry artillery • Late-war restructuring
20
25
32
Materials and construction methods
Timber • Revettments • Rocks and other materials • The principles of construction
Types of defensive position
Infantry positions • Crew-served weapons positions • Squad bunkers
Principles of camouflage
Theatre-specific defences
North Africa • Italy • The Eastern Front
42
49
The fortifications at war
A battalion-level defence, early war • El Alamein, Egypt, 1942 • Ortona, Italy, December 1943
Petsamo-Kirkenes, Finland, October 1944 • Palenberg, Germany, October 1944
An assessment of German field fortifications
Bibliography
Glossary
Index
61
63
63
64
© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
Introduction
While the German Army (deutschen
Heer)
is perhaps best known for elaborate,
massive concrete and steel fortifications, such as the Westwall (or ‘Siegfried Line’)
and Atlantikwall, the fortifications that a German soldier was most familiar with
were the ones he dug himself. Whether built on the sprawling steppes of Russia,
in the deserts of North Africa, in the mountains of Italy, in European hills and
forests, or among the rubble of countless battered cities, these were the
fortifications that truly defined the boundaries of the Third Reich.
The focus of this study is the field fortifications constructed by combat
troops defending the frontline. Large, permanent fortifications are beyond the
scope of this book, and are dealt with in accompanying Fortress titles (such as
Fortress 15:
Germany’s West Wall).
The core focus will be temporary and
semi-permanent crew-served weapon positions and individual and small-unit
fighting positions, built with local materials and occasionally construction
matériel.
Little engineer support was provided: pioneer troops may have
provided advice, but the infantry mostly built these positions and obstacles.
However, pioneer (Pionier) and construction (Baupionier) units and
Organisation Todt civilian labourers did sometimes prepare defences behind
the front for units to fall back to.
While wartime intelligence studies and reports provide detailed information
on German field defences, only limited post-war study has been undertaken.
This is largely due to their temporary nature, and the fact that little survives of
them today. The Wehrmacht (consisting of the Heer, Luftwaffe and
Kriegsmarine) used the same basic doctrine and manuals for positioning and
construction purposes as did the Waffen-SS. With the exception of local
improvisation, a factor common to all armies in the field, all branches of the
German armed forces employed these field fortifications and obstacles.
4
What the Germans did not want to
experience again – a machine-gun
platoon on the Western Front,
1914. Watercooled 7.92mm MG.08
heavy machine guns were reissued
to fortress machine-gun battalions
late in World War II.
© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
German tactical defence
doctrine
‘Elastic defence’
The experiences on the Western Front during World War I had a strong
influence (both negative and positive) on post-war defence doctrine. The
positive aspect of World War I to the Germans, from the doctrinal standpoint,
was the development of what is informally known as the ‘elastic defence’
(elastische
Kampfverfahren,
literally ‘elastic battle procedures’). By 1916 it had
been realised that solid multi-layered trench systems and an unyielding defence,
aimed at holding on to every metre of ground, were impractical. Massive six-day
artillery barrages would shatter defences and the defenders. General of Infantry
Erich Ludendorff endorsed a more in-depth defence. While still relying on
continuous interconnected trench lines, the defences were subdivided into three
zones: (1) combat outpost zone with minimal lookouts to warn of attacks and
keep patrols from penetrating deeper; (2) 1,500–3,000m-deep main battle zone
with complex trench systems concentrated on key terrain (rather than rigid lines
covering all areas) intended to halt the attack; and (3) rear zone with artillery and
reserves. While the battle zone still relied on trench lines, to establish the new
defences the Germans actually withdrew (previously unheard of) in some sectors
to more easily defended terrain, placed many of the trenches on reverse slopes to
mask them from enemy observation and fire, and established strongpoints on
key terrain. The establishment of the combat zone, supported by long-range
artillery, disrupted Allied attacks. After fighting its way through the outpost zone
the attack would often exhaust itself in the battle zone. Rather than attempting
to halt the attack outright, penetration of the battle zone was accepted. The
attack would become bogged down among the defences, battered by artillery fire
and counter-attacks. This was first implemented in April 1917, and by war’s end
in November 1918 the defences were completely rearranged under this concept.
It had proved itself, and was adopted by the post-war Reichsheer in 1921.
In spite of the much-vaunted
blitzkrieg concept of mobile
warfare, in 1940 only 10 per cent of
the German Army’s 138 divisions
were motorised. The infantry
division’s 27 rifle companies walked,
and most artillery and supply
transport were horse drawn. The
lack of mechanisation had a major
impact on how the Germans
conducted defensive operations.
Mobile warfare
There were negative influences too of
the experiences on the Western Front.
The horror, misery and prolonged
stalemate of trench or positional
warfare (Stellungskrieg) encouraged
many, like Hans von Seeckt, to find
another way to wage war. Some form
of mobile offensive was preferred and
defence was regarded as necessary
only for local holding actions or a
temporary situation until the
initiative was regained and the
offensive resumed.
The elastic defence was codified in
the two-volume manual called
Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen
Waffen
(Leadership and Combat of
the Combined Arms), published in
1921/23. This codification managed a
compromise between those who still
5
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