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Warrior

SPREY

PUBLISHING

Fallschirmjäger

German Paratrooper 1935 – 45

Br uce Quarrie

•

Illustrated by Velimir Vuksic

Warrior • 38

Fallschirmjäger

German Paratrooper 1935– 45

Br uce Quarrie

•

Illustrated by Velimir Vuksic

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

CHRONOLOGY

RECRUITMENT AND ENLISTMENT

BELIEF AND BELONGING

TRAINING

APPEARANCE AND EQUIPMENT

EVERYDAY LIFE

EXPERIENCE OF BATTLE

NOTES

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

GLOSSARY

COLOUR PLATE COMMENTARY

INDEX

FALLSCHIRMJÄGER

GERMAN PARATROOPER

1935–45

INTRODUCTION

‘You are the chosen fighting men of the Wehrmacht. You will seek

combat and train yourselves to endure all hardships. Battle shall

be your fulfilment.’

From Adolf Hitler’s

‘Ten Commandments’ to the Fallschirmtruppen.

he idea of airborne troops is far from new and dates back at least

to the ancient Greek legend of the warrior Bellerophon riding

into battle on the winged horse Pegasus. Even parachutes, as toys

modelled on parasols, have existed for centuries, but it was not until the

late 19th century that the idea of a ’chute without a rigid framework

evolved. The First World War brought the concept to maturity as a

life-saving device, first for observation balloon crews and then for those

of heavier-than-air machines. Early types were of the static line variety, in

which a rope attached to the aircraft pulls the parachute out of its

container. The ripcord, which proved a major benefit for pilots and

other aircrew, was not invented until 1919. However, the static line

variety came back into its own when the concept of parachute troopers

began to mature.

The first serious parachute experiments were conducted by the

Russians and Italians. Many German observers were interested, even

excited, but, bound by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, which

forbade reconstruction of an air force, they were forced to dream.

However, when Adolf Hitler was confirmed as Chancellor, the dreamers

and schemers began to work more openly towards their goals. Once he

repudiated the hated Versailles Treaty and re-introduced conscription,

all restrictions on their ambitions were removed, and few men were

more ambitious than the former First World War ‘Richthofen’ Staffel

fighter pilot ace Hermann Göring, who quickly rose to command the

reconstituted

Luftwaffe

(Air Force).

Göring had been amongst those who watched Russian paratroop

demonstration exercises in 1931 and 1935, and he had been so

impressed that he now decided to begin construction of a German

parachute corps. He already had a tiny nucleus of paratroops in the

former Prussian police Regiment ‘General Göring’, and in October

1936 he arranged a demonstration jump to encourage volunteers to

form a parachute rifle battalion within this regiment. Although the

demonstration was inauspicious, since one of the 36 jumpers injured

himself on landing and had to be carried off on a stretcher, Göring soon

had the necessary 600 recruits for his battalion. In 1938 the battalion was

transferred to the embryo 7

Flieger

(Airborne) Division

. Further

expansion was steady and, by the time general mobilisation for war was

ordered in August 1939, the Luftwaffe had two full parachute rifle

battalions with support troops as the nucleus of this first German

airborne division. The army (Heer), meanwhile, had a full infantry

division specially trained in air-landing techniques.

The difference between paratroops (Fallschirmtruppen) and air-

landing troops (Luftlandetruppen) is simple. The former are trained to

jump by parachute or land by glider to seize important tactical objectives

such as airfields or bridges ahead of advancing ground forces, holding

them until relieved. Paratroops are classed as light infantry (Jäger) and

do not have much in the way of heavy weapons nor an inexhaustible

supply of ammunition, so relief must be swift. Enter the air-landing

soldier, flown with heavier equipment in transport aircraft such as the

Junkers Ju 52, to land on ground already seized by the paratroops and

deploy rapidly in their support.

But, if paratroops are so vulnerable to counter-attack by conventional

forces, with artillery and tanks, why bother with them at all? The

kernel of the answer lies in the fact that most decisive battles are

won through a combination of speed, surprise and shock and not

necessarily through superior numbers in men or

matériel.

Outflanking

or, even better, getting behind the enemy’s lines and attacking him

from the rear, have always been the best, quickest and least costly

means of winning.

Under normal circumstances, soldiers regard what lies in front of

them as the enemy and what lies behind as friendly. Paratroops change

that through what has been aptly called ‘vertical envelopment’. Even a

relatively small force of men landed behind the lines causes everyone to

look over their shoulders rather than concentrating on their front.

The knowledge that a foe lies behind you causes disproportionate

apprehension, saps morale and draws off reserves which could otherwise

be deployed elsewhere more effectively

. Moreover, there are never

sufficient reserves to guard every possible objective against airborne

assault, so paratroops can normally expect to gain at least a temporary

numerical advantage. In the first couple of years of the Second

World War, it was this knowledge that the Germans exploited so

successfully with the

Blitzkrieg

(Lightning War) concept, to which the

Fallschirmtruppen were an inspired adjunct. So inspired, in fact, that

both America and Britain, which had been woefully slow in appreciating

the value of airborne forces, went into top gear to create their own after

the 1940 campaigns.

Prior to the almost total success of paratroop and air-landing

operations in April and May 1940, however, there were doubters even in

Germany, and there was considerable disagreement between the

Luftwaffe and the Heer as to how the new airborne forces should best

be deployed. Generally speaking, the air force pundits thought they

should merely be used in relatively small numbers as saboteurs to

disrupt enemy lines of communication, spread panic and delay the

arrival of reserves at the front. Many army officers, on the other hand,

believed in their employment

en masse

to create an instant bridgehead

in a location the enemy would not be expecting. In the end, of course,

both tactics would be employed during the war, proving only that each

side was equally right.

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