Osprey NVG 277 British Amphibious Assault Ships From Suez To The Falklands And The Present Day By Edward Hampshire.pdf

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BRITISH AMPHIBIOUS

ASSAULT SHIPS

From Suez to the Falklands and the present day

EDWARD HAMPSHIRE

ILLUSTRATED BY ADAM TOOBY

NEW VANGUARD 277

BRITISH AMPHIBIOUS

ASSAULT SHIPS

From Suez to the Falklands

and the present day

EDWARD HAMPSHIRE

ILLUSTRATED BY ADAM TOOBY

CONTENTS

BRITISH NAVAL STRATEGY AND AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE

LANDING CRAFT AND HELICOPTERS

• Large landing craft

• Medium landing craft

• Small landing craft

• Army landing craft

• Helicopters

LST 3 AND LSH(S) CLASSES

COMMANDO CARRIER CONVERSIONS:

ALBION,

BULWARK

AND

HERMES

FEARLESS CLASS

SIR LANCELOT CLASS,

SIR GALAHAD (II), SIR LAMARAK

AND

SIR CARADOC

HMS

OCEAN

BAY CLASS AND LOGISTICS SHIPS

ALBION CLASS

OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS

• The Suez Crisis

• The Cold War and ‘End of Empire’: 1957–82

• The Falklands campaign

• The late Cold War and after: 1982–2018

DISPOSAL AND FATES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INDEX

BRITISH AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIPS

From Suez to the Falklands and the

present day

BRITISH NAVAL STRATEGY AND AMPHIBIOUS

WARFARE

During World War II the United Kingdom developed an enormous

amphibious capability, including hundreds of landing ships and thousands of

landing craft, as well as an increasingly experienced and well-trained group

of servicemen to operate these vessels. Starting with the

Torch

landings in

North Africa in 1942 and culminating in the invasion of France in operations

Neptune

and

Dragoon

in June and August 1944, these forces, operating

alongside the US, were instrumental in enabling the defeat of Germany

in Europe. Allied amphibious operations in East Asia were also crucial in

defeating the Japanese.

With the end of the war, Britain’s amphibious capability was run down

alongside much of the rest of the Royal Navy. Most of the amphibious ships

had either been operated under Lend-Lease with the US, so were returned

to the US between 1945 and 1946, or had been converted from merchant

ships, so were converted back to civilian use. As it became clear that a long-

term confrontation with the Soviet Union and its allies was developing in

the 1940s, amphibious forces were not considered a key priority. Most

resources and attention were given to anti-submarine forces to counter

the significant Soviet submarine threat, and modern jet-capable aircraft

HMS

Reggio,

an LST 3 modified

as an assault landing ship

with davits for six LCA landing

craft, enters Malta harbour in

the mid-1950s. (Imperial War

Museum FL 5486)

carrier battle-groups able to

gain control of the seas and

strike at Soviet naval and land

targets. The Korean War of

1950–53 demonstrated to the

US government the continuing

importance of amphibious

forces in providing flanking

attacks in land campaigns and,

in the case of the landings at

Inchon, even to change the

course of a conflict. From

this point onwards the United

States began to invest heavily

in both its Marine Corps and

its specialized amphibious

vessels. The Royal Navy was

aware of these developments,

but did not devote significant

resources to renewing its much-shrunken World War II-era amphibious fleet.

However, a low level of active operational capability began to be recreated

through the establishment of an Amphibious Warfare Squadron based in

Malta in 1952.

In the early 1950s, the Royal Navy’s amphibious capability largely

remained focused on a number of British or Canadian-built Mark 3 Landing

Ships, Tank, or LST 3s, and smaller landing craft, all of which had been

built between 1944 and 1946. However, technology was beginning to change

how amphibious assaults would be undertaken. Ship-based helicopters could

now transport assault troops to their landing zones extremely rapidly, whilst

the threat from new fast submarines meant that amphibious forces would

need to be much quicker than the 10–13 knots that the existing LST 3s

could manage. A Chiefs of Staff working party in 1954 recommended that

amphibious warfare would have a role in raiding operations during wartime,

with exercises being undertaken up to battalion level, and some training

for brigade-level assaults. The Royal Marines would lead on this form of

specialist warfare, as general training across the Army would no longer be

required. These recommendations were accepted by the Chiefs and some

incremental steps were taken to improve the amphibious capability. Four

LST 3s were converted into assault landing ships, carrying a number of small

landing craft on davits, and in July 1956 proposals were put forward for

what would later be known as a ‘commando carrier’, based ‘East of Suez’,

to enable helicopter amphibious assault.

The 1956 Suez Crisis was a foreign policy disaster for the United

Kingdom: it demonstrated the UK’s financial and political dependence on the

United States, and resulted in a humiliating withdrawal from what had been

a successful amphibious operation. However, the landings at Suez, which

enabled a combined British, French and Israeli force to defeat Egyptian land

and air forces, demonstrated the utility of helicopter amphibious assault and

the need for new specialized assault ships to provide the speed and flexibility

necessary to make successful landings. In addition, following the 1957

Defence Review, the Royal Navy under Lord Mountbatten’s leadership had

Port Said in Egypt immediately

following the ill-fated British–

French assault to take control of

the Suez Canal. The amphibious

force, including LSTs, LCTs

and destroyers in gunfire

support roles, can be seen in

the distance. (Imperial War

Museum MH 23509)

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