Gunther Anders - On the Pseudo-Concreteness of Heidegger s Philosophy.pdf

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International Phenomenological Society
On the Pseudo-Concreteness of Heidegger's Philosophy
Author(s): Guenther Stern (Anders)
Source:
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
Vol. 8, No. 3 (Mar., 1948), pp. 337-371
Published by:
International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2103208
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ON THE PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS OF HEIDEGGER'S
PHILOSOPHY
I. HEIDEGGER CUTS ACROSS THE ALTERNATIVE
"NATURALISM-SUPRANATURALISM")
nosuch
in
characterization be found Heidegger's
can
works. Whatdo we
mean "cutting
by
across"?
asideintermezzos, history modern
Setting
the
of
philosophy,
particularly
of
that thepost-Hegelian
of
had
period, beena history "Naturalizations"-
of
of
naturalizationman,ofmorals, thestate, so on. The provinces
of
and
won
from
Christian
philosophy
had
to
automatically accrued therealmof
"Nature." Yet in the last century
"atheism"and "naturalism"
were
interchangeable
terms.
Notso for
Heidegger.Although inherited
he
from
atheism
naturalism,
particularly itsnineteenth
from
century
his
variant, keeps distance
be
from
naturalism-a
distancebarelyshorter
thanthe gulfthatexistsbetween
Christian
anthropology materialism.
and
True,the "Dasein"l-the topic
ofHeidegger's
philosophy-is
"hiesig,"
belongs
'ro-rco
Kitc6os,
it is
to
T
but
not"nature,"
muchless "life"in its biological
sense:forin Heidegger's
philosophy word"Nature"alreadydesignates "Seinsweise," a
the
a
i.e.,
modus
existendi
among
other
and
"is" only
"for" "Dasein."s2
modi, Nature
a
Though nature,
not
"Dasein" is farfrom
beingsomething thesupra-
of
natural
order:
there justas little
is
"Beyond"in Heidegger's
philosophy
as
there inmodern
is
science in historical
or
materialism.
Even in thatdis-
gutised whichthe philosophy bourgeois
form
in
of
society
had invented:
the
form "Ought be" or as "world wralues" "Beyond"
of
to
of
the
does not
' This
term below)
(see
designates specific
the
modum
existendi man, "being
of
the
there"; thefactof his existence.Beinguntranslatable German
not
the
term
will
beadopted
throughout article.
this
I Itmay
seem
superfluousstress this
to
that "for" notidentical theclassical
is
with
"for" the"Genesis"
in
according which
to
Nature beencreated man. We
has
for
consider however,
it,
important emphasize influence theJewish-Christian
to
the
of
"For" thehistory philosophy. a matter fact, represents ultimate,
in
of
the
As
of
it
though
secret,
basisforall variants "Transcendental
of
to
Philosophy"
according
which is not"parsinter
man
partes
or
mundi"'; theworld
but
a
rather "correlate"
a 'product" a "Datum"(derived
"dare"!)ora "property" man.
or
from
of
M37
the
cuts across thetradi-
tion, formulawould read: Heidegger's
philosophy
tionalalternatives
littlethat
"Naturalism-Supranaturalism."
It matters
is
the
If there a formula to define locusofHeidegger's
apt
Existential
and
the
Philosophy to clarify causeofitsintricacy itspower attrac-
and
of
338
PHILOSOPHY
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
enter dimension
his
"Dasein." His objective
seemsto be a newplane-
descriptions.
The strange
fact,that despite programmatic
its
soberness
and the drabness its subjects("Aleaning,"
of
"Perception,"
"Memory,"
etc.) Husserl's
phenomenology
could exertsuch a fascination
upon his
philosophical
contemporaries,
is easilyexplained thisveryfactthathe
by
would be utterly
unable to focusthe objects or to verify
the truthof his
to be taken
most
must
seriously.Heidegger's
philosophy notbe compared
verbal
with
those
merely
"syntheses," those
all
or
"Real-Idealisms" "Ideal-
Realisms"
which accumulated thecourse thelastcentury.
had
in
of
the
Firstofall: from purely
logical
angle, "neutrality" itsmerits.
his
has
Onceonepartofa logical
alternative abandoned, counterpart,
is
its
owing
to
itsmeaning itsvery
counterposition,
cannot
claimto a meaning
either.
of
is
the
"Natural"
Oncethe concept "Supra-natural" dropped, concept
intact
either. Obviously philosophers thelast cen-
remain
the
cannot
of
this
conclusion.By stressing
had
tury notdrawn necessary
"naturalism,"
a
of
that
on
they
were
preservingsystem concepts stilldepended thecoun-
terconcept had abolished.
they
to
It isneedless saythat
Was
Heidegger's outofthealternative notan
step
first
or
its
of
absolutely step. It had its pre-history,rather pre-histories
ancestries.
very
diverse
The one attemptto start "outside"the alternative
was the post-
of
Hegelian
"Philosophy MNind"
(example:
Dilthey)
according which
to
the
lifeof "Mind" or "History"
was notany longer
directed Providence,
by
as
to
although
theywerenot conceded belonging therealmof "Nature"
either. In hisalready
book
der
thoroughly
forgotten ontheGrenzen natur-
and
wissenschaftlichen
Rickert,
epigonic insuffi-
Begriffsbildung, in a wholly
to
cient
its
way,
had tried givethisdimension logical
articulation.
in
had
Furthermore,all hisphenomenological Husserl undertaken
works,
his
after
a
outside alternative:
the
the task of exploring "region"
when,
in
attackon "Psychologism," naturalism psychology logic,he
and
i.e.,
to
he
started describe so-called
"intentionalen
the
Strukturen," neither
aimedat "Metaphysics Mind" (although attempt temporarily,
of
his
was
evenbyhimself,
as
nor
mistaken a sortofnewPlatonism) at a psychology;
he
but,as it is sufficiently
which was
known, some"neutral"
at
province,
in
right giving newlabel,namely
a
"phenomenology."
After Husserl
all,
had started
from
mathematics,
whosesubjects,
though supranatural,
not
do notbelong therealm Nature
con-
to
of
either. He hadbeenabsolutely
sistent
when never
he
tired requiring hisreaders uncustomary
in
from
an
which
approach toooften
(all
misrepresented
as "Mysticism")
without
they
a plane that requiresa new approach,a new vocabulary,new categories
Let us admitfrom outset:The philosophical
the
"draught,"('"Tiefgang"'
andtheeffects hisphilosophy
of
"outside customary
the
alternatives"
have
PHILOSOPHY
OF
PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS HEIDEGGER'S
339
in
that
search:the "life" or "stream"of consciousness he described his
that
was
their
or
objects," so neutral,
analyses the"actsmeaning having
of
consolidate descriptions meansof
his
by
he believed couldmethodically
he
his
of
as
theproxy, by thesuspension thequestion to whether objects
thus,
''areorarenot."
had cut
that
on
may
Thisemphasis rhrox' causetheimpression Husserl
to
and
Husserl
off ontological
question
altogether, thatthejumpfrom
the
will
shortofa miracle-which
is
however,
impression,
Heidegger nothing
as
Reality,
ariseonlyif oneunderstands "Sein" ("being")exclusively
by
his
he
meantin NaturalScience. Although safeguarded "Gegenstand-
he
of
bereich," "province intentional
the
objects," meansofthe rhrox',
by
his
to
he
did
certainly notmeanhisobjects be phantoms.Somehow meant
was
Plato'sParmenides.What,however the
as
objects
6vra,
to speakwith
of
meaning "6v" here?
tasks to answer
or
one
It was Heidegger's, morecorrectly, ofHeidegger's
this question,at least, to formulatethe questionof the "Seins-Sinn"and
opened a provincebeyond metaphysicsas well as beyond empiricalre-
in
acts. Asa matter fact,
of
of
despite
themeaning "being" the intentional
of
philosophy, a large
to
thewholly
different andpurpose Heidegger's
mood
for
his
field" beenpre-tilled Husserl: the"Dasein"3
had
extent "thematic
by
had
(which
already
with
contrasts the"Vorhandensein"4
which
Heidegger
in
of
is
by
beenbracketed by Husserl means thei7roxj), defined Heideg-
by
something"
("Aussein
as
meaning
"being
after
ger
"Sorge."5 Now,
"Sorge"
in
from
aufetwas"),
differing this"something" thesamewayas Husserl's
to
fromits "object,"represents a cer-
"intentional
act" had differed
philoso-
taindegree common
of
and
denominator Husserl's Heidegger's
the
the
English
readers understand tran-
may
as
phies. Strange itmaysound,
to
readers,
because
more
easilythanGerman
sition
from
Husserl Heidegger
of the connotations,
"tendency,"or "intention"conjuredup by the word
from
between"act"
revealthe "relation"
traditional
psychology),
borrowed
way.
a
and its "object" in a purely"structural," whollyunpragmatic
term, im-
had
when
using famous
the
Husserl,
however,
"Intentionality":
whatsoever to "tendency" "intention"-and all
akin
or
this
pliednothing
of
he
which used forhis characterization"in-
theless,as themodel-acts
or
"recollection," "thinking,"
tentionality" the acts of "perception,"
(as
acts"-of course,
hunger modelof "intentional
as
Had Husserlchosen
a purely
of
his
assumption
considering placeinthehistory science
academic
3
V.S.
4
1.
footnote
This equals the naked "esse" ofobjectsof Nature; resp.resexistences.
6
This termwhich combinesthe connotations
of "cura," "worrying,"
"caring
for..
I,"
and "takingcare of," wouldbe besttranslated "interest," understood
by
if
in its broadestmeaningalthoughthe word,unfortunately,
lacks the gloomynuance
ofthe Germanoriginal. Thus we will keep Heidegger's
wordagain.
340
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
PHILOSOPHY
RESEARCH
tionaround
would
1895-phenomenology havelooked
different.
very
Had
as
he chosen
"hunger" "Modellakt"and its adequation better
(or
"satis-
instead "imagination" its "adequation" "fulfillment,"
of
and
or
faction")
he would
havebeencompelled engage thediscussion strictly
to
in
of
"onto-
instead embarking thedescription the"pure"
of
logical"
of
problems
upon
and "bracketed flux context "intentional
in"
or
of
relations" which,
in
from
of
thetime hisbookIdeenon,hesawthefield hisresearch; wouldhave
of
he
beenforced asking following
into
the
questions: Proxy legitimate
"Is
still
in
act
face of an intentional as 'hunger'
which(although
structurally
"con-
its
taining" "immanent"
does
object)is whatit is,becauseit precisely not
its
contain object(food)? Is the ontological
of
neutrality theintentional
act's "immanent"
and
objecta genuine
"immanence" "neutrality"?Does
rather
not "neutrality"
indicate
the "not-having"?Could the
Proxy)
be
in
maintained faceofan act whose"agent"(theliving
or
being man) has
no other
interest to actuallyseize and literally
but
his
consume object?
in
Couldit be maintained faceofan "act" whose
bearliving
agentcannot
orlivewithout
it?"
These,of course,
werenot Husserl'squestions. Had he focussed
this
of
problem "without," problem actual"want"and "incorporation,"
the
of
they
wouldhavedrawn
himout ofthetranscendental
sphere;
they
would
haveforced intoan exploration what"being"meansin faceofthe
him
of
first
"absent"and then,materialistically
speaking,
"immanent"
object;
and finally the interpretation what"being"meansin faceof the
into
of
"agent"oftheact-thehungry for
one, whom object(food) a question
the
is
of"being"or "notbeing." In short,
Husserl
wouldhavebeencompelled
toresume classical
the
of
problem "want"or"need," discussion which
of
the
nosmaller
idealists
thanPlato(inhisPhilebos) Hegel(from Jenenser
and
his
Logic had prepared a mostprofound
in
on)
way.
We admit
thatHusserlcouldnotask thesequestions;
after hisulti-
all,
mateinterest
centered theoretical
in
structures,
exactly that of Neo-
as
Kantianism itwastheoretical that usedas models histheory
had;
acts
he
for
ofactsin general, it is from Theory Science
and
the
of
thathe had started
outas a philosopher. is this"defect," dent,
It
this
intowhich
Heidegger
drovehis axe, although-we have to stressthatpointfrom veryoutset-
the
of
and his "polemicdependence"on the psychology perception
and recollec-
he cautiously
abstained
from
splitting trunk:
the
Heidegger
tookoverat
theboundary ofHusserl's
line
province
without
actually
reaching even
or
wishing reachthe problem
to
just sketched, whichthe "battleof the
in
books,"thediscussion
between-'idealism materialism,
and
becomes
really
acute. We willsee later on, that he knewwhathe was doingwhenhe took
a long
run, madebuta short
but
jumpwhich
landed
himonly theground
on
ofExistentialism.

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