Air Campaign 019 - Malaya & Dutch East Indies 1941-42. Japan's Air Power Shocks the World (2020).pdf

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C A M P A I G N
A I R
MALAYA & DUTCH
EAST INDIES 1941–42
Japan’s air power shocks the world
MARK STILLE
|
I L LU S T R AT E D B Y J I M L AU R I E R
A I R C A M PA I G N
MALAYA & DUTCH
EAST INDIES 1941–42
Japan’s air power shocks the world
MARK STILLE | ILLUSTRATED BY JIM LAURIER
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
CHRONOLOGY
ATTACKER’S CAPABILITIES
DEFENDER’S CAPABILITIES
CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES
THE CAMPAIGN
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
4
5
8
19
34
41
89
93
95
4
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
This is an impressive
September 1941
photograph of 243
Squadron in flight with its
Buffalo fighters. Note the
aircraft are grouped in
sections of three with a
leader and two wingmen.
RAF fighter pilots had little
respect for their Japanese
counterparts before the
war, born from near-total
ignorance of their
potential enemy. When
hostilities began, it was
quickly apparent that RAF
fighter pilots were stuck
flying an inferior aircraft.
(Library of Congress)
When the European powers went to war in September 1939, the Far East remained a
backwater. But the quiet in this part of the world was only temporary. The Japanese Empire
had already embarked on a policy of expansion having annexed Manchuria in 1931 and
invaded China in 1937. Operations in China were indecisive but the obvious intent of the
Japanese to impose their domination over China by increasingly brutal means increased
tensions between the United States and Japan. In 1940, the Germans conquered the
Netherlands and France and put Great Britain under direct threat of invasion. This presented
the Japanese with an opportunity to insulate themselves from increasing economic pressure
from the United States. The resource‑rich colonial possessions of the European powers in
the Far East lay open to attack. French Indochina was a rich source of rice and provided an
ideal staging point to attack the other European possessions in the Far East. The Federated
Malay States under British control was a source of much of the world’s tin and rubber and
had considerable oil resources; the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) was oil rich.
The Japanese advance into Southeast Asia was the most important operation in the series
of Japanese attacks in the opening months of the war. Contrary to Allied expectations, the
Japanese were able to conduct multiple thrusts concurrently. The strongest Allied forces
in the region were the British air, naval, and ground forces in Malaya and Singapore.
Additionally, American forces in the Philippines had to be neutralized. Once this had been
accomplished, the assault on the NEI could begin. Seizure of the NEI was most important to
the Japanese from a resource perspective, and this had to be done quickly before the Dutch
could comprehensively destroy the oil facilities or the Americans or British could introduce
reinforcements.
The entire Japanese plan was largely based on the successful application of air power.
Allied ground forces in the region outnumbered the relatively small Imperial Army forces
committed to the operation. The decisive edge for the Japanese was in air power where they
held a significant advantage over British, Dutch, and American forces. Gaining air superiority
would permit the Japanese to fully exploit their superior naval forces. For the conquest of
5
Malaya, the attack was supported primarily by the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force (IJAAF)
with the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Force (IJNAF) playing a supporting role. The IJAAF
planned to destroy British air power in northern Malaya in a classic offensive counterair
campaign lasting only a few days.
British defense planning in the Far East was also built around air power. The centerpiece of
the British position in the region was the naval base at Singapore and the assumption was that
it would receive a large fleet soon after hostilities opened with Japan. This assumption turned
out to be invalid when conditions in Europe extended the time it would take the Royal Navy
(RN) to dispatch a fleet to the Far East. The size of the British Army in Malaya was insufficient
to repel a Japanese invasion; this left the Royal Air Force (RAF) as the principal defender of
British interests in the Far East. Even with this realization, the RAF in the Far East was not
prepared for war. It lacked sufficient aircraft to perform its missions of defending the naval base
at Singapore and seriously weakening a Japanese seaborne invasion force. Most of the aircraft
assigned to the Far East were obsolescent. Also, although in the middle of a large‑scale expansion
when the Pacific War began, the RAF did not possess an adequate infrastructure to withstand
a Japanese attack. This lack of sufficient modern aircraft and the supporting infrastructure for
air defense would have severe consequences in the forthcoming campaign.
The Japanese campaign to occupy the NEI was even more dependent on air power since
the Japanese would have to seize a series of airfields on various islands to support their leapfrog
advance. This campaign was supported almost exclusively by the IJNAF. Facing the Japanese
was a mixed bag of Allied air units, including the Dutch East Indies Air Squadron with a
combination of Dutch, German, and American‑designed and supplied aircraft. The United
States Army Air Force (USAAF) also sent significant, but ultimately inadequate, numbers of
aircraft to Java, the main island in the NEI and the ultimate objective of the Japanese. The RAF
fell back to airfields on Sumatra in the NEI in the last stages of the Malaya campaign, and was
involved in the final stages of the campaign to defend the NEI. For the same reason that the
Allied air campaign failed in Malaya, the effort to defend the NEI was also futile.
CHRONOLOGY
1941
December 8
Japanese make coordinated landings at
Singora and Patani in southern Thailand and at Kota
Bharu in northern Malaya
Japanese make first raid on Singapore and begin a series
of raids against British airfields in northern Malaya
December 9
Japanese seize Kota Bharu airfield
Second day of air combat shatters British air power in
northern Malaya
December 10
Battleship
Prince of Wales
and battlecruiser
Repulse
sunk by Japanese air attack
December 11
British fighters withdrawn to defend
Singapore and supply convoys giving Japanese air
superiority over northern Malaya
Battle for Jitra results in a major British defeat leading to
the loss of northern Malaya
December 14
Japanese capture Alor Star Airfield
virtually intact
December 16
Japanese land at Miri, British Borneo
December 19
RAF abandons Ipoh Airfield
December 25
Japanese capture Jolo in central NEI
December 31
British ground commander ordered to
hold airfields in central Malaya long enough to allow the
arrival of several reinforcement convoys
1942
January 3
British abandon Kuantan Airfield

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