Air Campaign 013 - Guadalcanal 1942-43. Japan's Bid to Knock Out Henderson Field COMP.pdf

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C A M P A I G N
A I R
GUADALCANAL
1942–43
MARK STILLE
|
Japan’s bid to knock out Henderson
Field and the Cactus Air Force
I L LU S T R AT E D B Y J I M L AU R I E R
A I R C A M PA I G N
GUADALCANAL
1942–43
Japan’s bid to knock out Henderson Field and the Cactus Air Force
MARK STILLE
I LLU STR ATE D BY JI M LAURIE R
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
CHRONOLOGY
ATTACKER’S CAPABILITIES
DEFENDERS’ CAPABILITIES
CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES
THE CAMPAIGN
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
4
9
11
18
34
42
90
94
95
4
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
The Grumman F4F
Wildcat was the
outstanding aircraft of the
Guadalcanal campaign.
Though supposedly
outclassed by its Japanese
counterpart the “Zero”
fighter, the Wildcat more
than held its own when it
was flown using tactics to
maximize its strengths.
(Official Marine Corps
photo courtesy of Marine
Corps History Division)
While the battle of Midway fought between June 4 and 6, 1942 is usually viewed as the single
most decisive battle of the Pacific War between Japan and the United States, the campaign for
Guadalcanal between August 1942 and February 1943 was much more decisive. Not only did
it subject the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and Navy (IJN) to a six-month grinding battle
of attrition which the IJN in particular could not afford, but it proved that, even under what
were strategically advantageous circumstances, the Japanese were unable to stop the American
offensive in the Pacific. The campaign for Guadalcanal was a bitter contest in which ground,
naval, and air forces were locked into an interrelated struggle. In what became the pattern
for the rest of the war, air power was the deciding factor in this campaign. The airfield on
Guadalcanal became the fulcrum for the entire battle and American ground, naval, and air
forces were focused on holding the airfield and keeping it operational. Despite their numerical
advantages, the Japanese were never able to mass their forces to seize Henderson Field or
to knock it out of action for a prolonged period. Possession of the airfield gave the United
States the margin of victory in the campaign and opened the door on the long road to Tokyo.
Japanese expansion in the South Pacific
The Japanese opened the Pacific War with attacks in many areas to secure the objectives
laid out in their First Operational Phase. The principal objectives in the opening phase of
the war included the Philippines, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, and Rabaul on
the island of New Britain in the South Pacific. All except the Philippines were occupied
on schedule or earlier. In January 1942, the Japanese occupied Rabaul against minimal
Australian resistance. Rabaul possessed a large natural harbor and several airfields and quickly
became the principal Japanese facility in the South Pacific. To the Americans, Rabaul was
a threat as it was the potential base for further Japanese expansion in the South Pacific. In
particular, the Americans were concerned about the threat to the sea line of communications
(SLOCs) from the United States to Australia.
5
All of Japan’s First Operational Phase objectives were captured by May 1942 with the
surrender of the last American forces in the Philippines. In the Second Operational Phase,
the Japanese sought to create strategic depth for their new possessions. The Aleutian
Islands in the North Pacific and Midway Atoll in the Central Pacific were potential
targets, but the South Pacific was the area of most future expansion. Potential targets in
the region included eastern New Guinea, the Fijis, Samoa, and “strategic points in the
Australian area.” This was a very ambitious list and was beyond the means of Japanese
forces and the shipping required to support them. The problem of inadequate forces
and shipping was even more pronounced when simultaneous operations in the Central
and South Pacific were considered. The Japanese had no choice but to sequence their
operations.
There were differences within the IJN about how best to proceed and the IJA refused
to write a blank check for potential expansion in the South Pacific since it had higher
priorities for committing its forces. Within the Imperial Navy, the Commander of the
Combined Fleet, Fleet Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, wanted to give the Central Pacific
attack priority. He planned an attack against Midway Atoll to draw out the remaining
units of the US Pacific Fleet where they would be destroyed. The Naval General Staff
preferred an immediate advance into the South Pacific to cut the SLOCs between the
United States and Australia. The IJA largely left the direction of strategy in the Pacific up
to the IJN, but it made clear that the commitment of large ground forces was impossible.
This precluded an attack on Australia, but operations against South Pacific islands were
still possible.
In early April, the Naval General Staff and the Combined Fleet came to an agreement
on the phasing of future operations. Just as he had during the debate over his Pearl Harbor
operation, Yamamoto used the threat of resignation to get his Midway plan approved.
However, the price of this approval was a compromise plan in which the Combined Fleet
would conduct a set of tightly sequenced operations in the South Pacific in early May
followed by the main operation against Midway and the Aleutians in early June. The
offensive operations in May included an amphibious operation to seize Port Moresby
on New Guinea and the occupation of Tulagi Island in the southern Solomons. This
The Zero built a
formidable reputation
early in the war against
weak Allied resistance.
This is a Zero aboard an
IJN carrier during the
battle of Santa Cruz in
October 1942. Against
the principal USN and
Marine fighter of the
period, the F4F Wildcat,
the significant weaknesses
of the Zero were exposed.
(IJN/Public domain)

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