Air Campaign 014 - Schweinfurt-Regensburg 1943. 8 AF’s Costly Early Daylight Battles (2020) COMP.pdf

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C A M P A I G N
A I R
SCHWEINFURT–
REGENSBURG 1943
MARSHALL L. MICHEL III
|
Eighth Air Force’s costly early daylight
battles
I L LU S T R AT E D B Y J I M L AU R I E R
A I R C A M PA I G N
SCHWEINFURT–
REGENSBURG 1943
Eighth Air Force’s costly early daylight battles
MARSHALL L. MICHEL III
ILLUS TR ATED BY J IM LAU RI E R
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
CHRONOLOGY
ATTACKER’S CAPABILITIES
DEFENDER’S CAPABILITIES
CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES
THE CAMPAIGN
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
INDEX
4
6
11
25
40
42
93
95
4
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
A classic picture of the
most numerous and
important VIII Bomber
Command bomber, the
B‑17F. The B‑17 was
valued for its toughness
and because it was easy
to fly in the tight
formations necessary for
mutual protection, though
British bombers carried a
much heavier bomb load.
(National Archives and
Records Administration –
NARA)
When the United States of America entered World War II its most useful ally was the
United Kingdom, which had already been at war for more than two years, and the two
quickly acted to coordinate their war objectives. At the Arcadia Conference in Washington
from December 22, 1941 to January 14, 1942, the British and Americans agreed that
Germany was the most dangerous enemy and its defeat was the first priority, which would
mean an invasion of Europe. But first the Luftwaffe and Germany’s industrial capabilities
had to be reduced, and to that end America began to build a bomber and fighter force,
designated the Eighth Air Force and based in the United Kingdom, which would initially
be responsible for the American air offensive against Germany. Most of the American air
leaders were products of the Air Corps Tactical School, and this school gave American
airmen their prewar air doctrine, that unescorted but heavily armed bombers attacking
critical targets with daylight precision bombing were the key to victory in war. Eighth Air
Force Bomber Command (VIII Bomber Command) would be committed to this doctrine
for most of 1943.
With the Germans seemingly likely to conquer Russia, almost in desperation in April
1942 the American military proposed that the Allies invade Europe in mid-1943 in
Operation
Roundup,
and even offered a minor invasion, Operation
Sledgehammer,
in late
1942 if necessary. The British demurred, and in July 1942 US President Roosevelt discarded
this idea and instead ordered the American armed forces to support the invasion of North
Africa, Operation
Torch,
in November 1942. This would allow American forces to engage
the Germans in land combat (the British were already fighting in the Western Desert)
and the invasion of Europe would be left until it was assured of success.
Eighth Air Force had been building slowly since 1942, but to support
Torch
the command
was gutted, stripped of the bulk of its B-24s, many of its B-17s, and virtually all of its P-38
fighters. This diversion of resources to
Torch
significantly delayed the Eighth’s development
of a combat capability. Major General Ira C. Eaker was named commander of the Eighth
Air Force on December 1, 1942.
5
When Roosevelt, Churchill, and other allied leaders met at the Casablanca Conference
in January 1943, one of the things they agreed to do was to attack Germany with bombers
until a land invasion was possible. The Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command argued
for the RAF’s plan for night area bombing of German cities, but American Generals
George C. Marshall (US Army Chief of Staff ), Henry “Hap” Arnold (Army Air Force
Chief of Staff ), and Eaker vigorously promoted the American plan for daylight precision
strategic bombing. Eaker presented a briefing to Churchill, “The Case for Day Bombing,”
which he defined as round-the-clock bombing of Germany. Churchill liked this and
accepted the idea.
There was important subtext to this. All of the Army Air Force leadership wanted their
command to become independent of the army after the war, and they saw the daylight
bombing campaign as a way to a postwar independent Air Force.
On May 18, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) approved the formal “Plan
for the Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom,” and in June 1943 the
Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) officially began. VIII Bomber Command was to
begin its role in the CBO under the name of Operation
Pointblank,
but the CCS had
made it clear to the US Army Air Force (USAAF) and the Eighth Air Force leadership
that
Pointblank’s
objective was the defeat or destruction of the German day fighter force.
Pointblank
was only expected to prepare for an invasion, not to “win the war.” While the
RAF was included in
Pointblank,
at this point it simply could not hit German aircraft
factories or airfields with any accuracy, so the destruction of the German day fighter force
would be the responsibility of Eighth Air Force, as would most of the other targets that
required precision bombing – the remainder of the German aircraft industry, ball bearing
plants and oil.
On the German side, the Luftwaffe priorities at the beginning of 1943 were mainly
offensive – the Eastern Front and the Mediterranean Front. Defensively, it was focused
on RAF night bombing, and USAAF daylight bombing was its fourth concern. The day
fighter organization, the Reichs-Luftverteidigung (Air Defense of the Reich or RLV), did
have a robust day fighter defense on the English Channel/North Sea coast, with one elite
Jagdgeschwader
(fighter wing) comprising four groups, but there were virtually no fighter
defenses in the center of the Reich.
Indeed, the Germans had generally neglected their daylight air defenses in the center
of the country. The penetration of the tough American bombers was a new challenge to
the Luftwaffe fighter pilots, but they began to develop new tactics in late 1942, when
Adolf Galland (the chief of the German fighter force) and Erhard Milch (Air Inspector
General) started to bring in fighters from Russia and the Mediterranean to bolster the
Reich’s defenses.
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