Air Campaign 006 - Operation Linebacker II 1972. The B-52s Are Sent To Hanoi (2018) OCR.pdf

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C A M P A I G N
A I R
OPERATION
LINEBACKER II
1972
The B-52s are sent to Hanoi
MARSHALL L. MICHEL III
|
I L LU S T R AT E D B Y J I M L AU R I E R
A I R C A M PA I G N
OPERATION
LINEBACKER II
1972
The B-52s are sent to Hanoi
MARSHALL L. MICHEL III |
ILLU S TR ATED BY J IM LAUR IE R
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
CHRONOLOGY
ATTACKERS’ CAPABILITIES
DEFENDERS’ CAPABILITIES
CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES
THE CAMPAIGN
AFTERMATH AND ANALYSIS
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
4
6
9
20
29
38
86
93
95
4
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
Probably the most vital
USAF aircraft in the
Vietnam War were the
KC-135 “Young Tiger”
tankers. Here a KC-135
refuels a B-52D. (National
Museum of the USAF)
I flew these missions. I was a young captain flying F-4s out of Udorn Royal Thai Air Base,
Thailand in December 1972 when we stood down on December 17. We knew something
was up, but most of us expected that we would be going back to Hanoi again with tactical
strikes. Late that afternoon we were standing by the operations desk waiting for the schedule
to be posted when Jon Baker, one of the pilots who worked in the wing headquarters, walked
in with his eyes as big as saucers. He said, “It’s a giant f***ing BUFF
1
escort.” We all knew
that the United States was going all-out for the win, and we knew we were going to be a
part of history being made.
So off we went for 11 nights on an operation called
Linebacker II.
For the first four nights
we watched the B-52s get shot to pieces executing a stupid, inflexible plan that we later
learned had been made by planners at the Strategic Air Command (SAC) headquarters in
Omaha, Nebraska, planners who had never seen a surface-to-air missile. It was only the night
after Christmas that the B-52 crews were able to make their own plan, a plan that quickly
overwhelmed the North Vietnamese missile crews and fulfilled the statement that Kissinger
had made two months before: “peace is at hand.”
I knew some of the B-52 crews, and over the next few years in Officers’ Club bars met
many others, and over drinks I slowly learned the real story of how badly SAC had planned
the missions and why it happened. Thus I, and many others who were involved with the
operation, were appalled when the Office of Air Force History published a monograph,
Linebacker II: A View From the Rock,
an inaccurate and self-aggrandizing memoir written
by the Andersen B-52 wing commander, Brigadier General James R. McCarthy, and his
administrative assistant during the operation, Lieutenant Colonel George B. Allison.
The monograph exonerated the SAC staff from their egregious decisions – decisions that
even infuriated President Nixon – and it was clear that Brigadier General McCarthy was
1
Big Ugly Fat F***er – the B-52’s affectionate nickname
5
simply trying to stay in the SAC leadership’s good graces in hopes of further promotion –
which, justly, he did not receive.
When the Air Force in its wisdom sent me to Harvard in 1989, I took as my project the
task of finding out what really happened during
Linebacker II,
and I continued the project
a few years later when I was selected as the Verville Fellow at the Smithsonian’s National Air
and Space Museum. The project took six interesting years to complete and included a trip
to Hanoi funded by the Museum, several very interesting sessions with General Alexander
Haig, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s assistant, and interviews, written and
oral, with participants in the missions. The result was my second book,
The Eleven Days of
Christmas: America’s Last Vietnam Battle.
Thanks to General Haig and the participants in the operation, the book told the real
story behind the planning failures and how the U-Tapao B-52 wing commander, Brigadier
General Glenn Sullivan, went directly to the SAC commander and insisted that SAC allow
the wings to change their tactics. His intervention probably saved the operation but cost
him his career.
While
The Eleven Days
was well received, I was not completely satisfied, for two reasons.
First, although I was able to gather a good deal of information from my trip to Hanoi and
incorporate it into the book, this comprised mainly written translations from government
sources. What I really needed to describe the operation properly was a series of meetings
with a translator to interview the North Vietnamese missile crews who fought the battle.
Secondly,
The Eleven Days
dealt with operations which were very complex on both sides;
and when Walter Carroll, a friend of formidable intelligence and some military background
(as well as being a regular lunch partner at the Boston Club), mentioned to me that he had
found the book “a bit confusing,” I realized that I needed to consider that in future works.
Fortunately, in the fall of 2017 two things happened that led to the work you are about to
read. First was the exciting offer from Osprey Publishing for me to write two books about the
Linebacker
campaigns. The second was a unique conference, “Dogfight to Detente,” in San
Diego, CA. It was a meeting of Vietnam War fighter pilots, both American and Vietnamese,
and I was able to attend. There I met two younger Vietnamese pilots, Nguyen Sy Hung and
Nguyen Nam Lien, who were also historians. Both had read
The Eleven Days
and another
earlier book that they particularly liked,
Clashes: Air Combat Over North Vietnam 1965‑1972.
They were interested in collaborating on a book written from both sides about Vietnam War
air-to-air combat and invited me to come over to Vietnam and discuss it. I agreed and asked
them if, at the same time, I could meet with some of the missile crews and talk about the
Christmas bombing for my
Linebacker II
Osprey book.
That is how the book started. I spent two weeks in Hanoi and Saigon researching the
project and Mr Sy Hung provided me with one of the few English translations of the
wonderful book by Luu Trong Lan,
Christmas Bombing: Dien Bien Phu in the Air.
That book
inspired me to return to the B-52 Victory Museum in Hanoi. I had visited this museum
several times before but mainly to look at the aircraft and missiles; after reading Luu Trong
Lan’s book I realized that the most important objects in the museum were in fact the books
that were preserved in glass cases. These books described the long process the Vietnamese
missile crews went through to learn how to defeat the B-52s’ powerful electronic warfare suite
that was intended to jam the most advanced Soviet Cold War missile systems. Luu Trong Lan
described how early in the war officers from the North Vietnamese Air Defense headquarters
went south where the B-52s operated regularly and painstakingly drew images of the B-52
jamming patterns as well as learning what the B-52 tactics were, the altitudes and speeds they
flew, and any other relevant information. The B-52s had never been to Hanoi, so when these
trips were made they probably seemed almost academic, though the North Vietnamese were
able to shoot a few missiles at B-52s in Laos or in the very south of North Vietnam – missile
shots that missed but made the B-52 crews (and SAC) very nervous.
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