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THE BALKANS
1940–41 (1)
Mussolini’s Fatal Blunder in the Greco-Italian War
PIER PAOLO BATTISTELLI
ILLUSTRATED BY ADAM HOOK
CAMPAIGN 358
THE BALKANS
1940–41 (1)
Mussolini’s Fatal Blunder in the Greco-Italian War
PIER PAOLO BATTISTELLI
ILLUSTRATED BY ADAM HOOK
Series editor Nikolai Bogdanovic
CONTENTS
ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN
CHRONOLOGY
OPPOSING COMMANDERS
Italian
n
4
6
8
Greek
OPPOSING FORCES
Italian
n
13
Greek
n
Order of battle
OPPOSING PLANS
Italian
n
27
Greek
THE CAMPAIGN
The Italian offensive begins
n
Naval and air operations
n
The Greek response
The Italians’ darkest hour
n
Advance to Këlcyrë
n
The Battle of Këlcyrë
n
The Italian ‘Spring Offensive’
32
AFTERMATH
THE BATTLEFIELDS TODAY
FURTHER READING
INDEX
91
93
94
95
ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN
The Italian attack against Greece launched on 28 October 1940 is usually
portrayed as Mussolini’s whimsical decision, provoked by the news of the
entry of German troops into Romania. This simplistic interpretation has
hidden the route Italy took to aggressive action, which started with the
seizure of Albania in May 1939.
Facing the imminent outbreak of war in Europe, at the end of August
1939 Mussolini ordered the Italian Army staff to prepare attack plans
against Yugoslavia and Greece. The Chief of the Army Staff General Alberto
Pariani prepared a plan against Greece focused on the seizure of Salonika,
as a means to isolate Yugoslavia. It was soon clear that there was a gaping
chasm between Italy’s poor state of readiness for war and the requirements of
Pariani’s plan, which led to its abandonment, and to the decision to instead
cultivate friendly relations with Greece.
In September 1939, Italy and Greece agreed to mutual disarmament along
the Greco-Albanian border, and by the end of the year, one of the Italian
divisions in Albania was transferred back to Italy. Given that Italy’s strategic
plans were now focusing on Yugoslavia, Greece was temporarily set aside.
The main advocate of war against Greece was Italy’s foreign minister
Count Galeazzo Ciano, who made his ambitions clear on 23 May 1940
to the commander of the Italian
Army in Albania, General Carlo
Geloso. Ciano requested an
attack plan be drawn up; in
the light of Geloso’s less than
enthusiastic response and his
remarks about a lack of troops, he
had him removed. Five days later,
Lieutenant-General Sebastiano
Visconti Prasca took over as the
new commander in Albania.
Shortly after the Fall of France,
at the end of June the Italians
began a propaganda campaign,
accusing Greece of hosting British
vessels in her waters.
This led, on 12 July, to the
first Italian attack on currently
neutral Greek forces, as Italian
A heavily burdened Italian
marine escorts two Albanian
prisoners during the April 1939
Italian invasion of Albania. To
the left, a bicycle-mounted
column of Bersaglieri moves
forward. (De Agostini via
Getty Images)
4
The remnants of one of the
torpedoes fired by the Italian
submarine
Delfino
that sank
the Greek cruiser
Helli
at Tinos.
The sinking caused a popular
outcry in Greece. (Athens
War Museum)
bombers targeted the Greek lighthouse-tender
Orion
and the destroyer
Hydra.
Then, on 15 August 1940, the cruiser
Helli
was sunk by the Italian
submarine
Delfino
sailing from Rhodes.
The sinking of the
Helli
was in fact unintentional, and it undermined
Ciano’s attack plans, outlined on 12 August during a meeting with
Mussolini and Visconti Prasca. The aim was to force Greece to surrender
the area of northern Epirus (Albanian Tsamouria), and to annex this area.
In the aftermath of the
Helli
incident, the Germans intervened, asking Italy
not to undertake any ‘Balkan venture’ that could destabilize the region.
On 22 August 1940, Mussolini postponed the attack on Greece, a new
deadline being eventually set for 20 October. In early September, the Italian
Army staff prepared plans for what was now known as ‘Contingency G’.
A month later, the failure of Germany’s air war against Britain led to a
reconsidering of the strategic
situation, and in early
October, the Italian Army
began a major demobilization.
Several factors led
Mussolini, on 13 October
1940, to order the setting in
motion of the Contingency
G plan. Two days later, he
informed his generals of his
decision to seize all of Greece.
Although various reasons
lay behind Mussolini ’s
precipitous decision, the
roots of Italy’s war against
Greece lay in the earlier
seizure of Albania, which had
sown the seeds of dangerous
Italian ambitions.
‘Führer, we march!’ This is
how Mussolini greeted Hitler,
who arrived in Florence on
28 October 1940, seeking to
prevent the Italian attack on
Greece. (NARA RG 242 JRB
47-051, via Digital
History Archive)
5

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