Duel 105 - US Navy Ships vs Japanese Attack Aircraft, 1941-42 (2020).pdf

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US NAVY SHIPS
JAPANESE ATTACK AIRCRAFT
1941–42
MARK STILLE
US NAVY SHIPS
JAPANESE ATTACK AIRCRAFT
1941–42
MARK STILLE
CONTENTS
Introduction
Chronology
Design and Development
Technical specification
The Strategic Situation
The Combatants
Combat
Statistics and Analysis
Aftermath
Further Reading
Index
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INTRODUCTION
The Pacific War was the first which was largely decided by air-to-sea combat. Aircraft
attacking ships at sea used either bombs or torpedoes. In either case, the skill of the
pilot was pivotal since he had to aim his aircraft at the target and maintain a constant
course to improve his chances of scoring a hit. This final approach phase provided the
best chance for antiaircraft fire to be effective. Hitting an attacking aircraft with
antiaircraft fire often resulted in its destruction, but just making the attacker maneuver
was an effective way to provide defense since it could spoil the pilot’s aim.
During the Pacific War, high-level bombing was almost entirely ineffective. This
forced medium bombers designed for high-level attacks to switch to low-level tactics,
allowing torpedoes to be employed. When multi-engined bombers were used in this
role, they tended to suffer very heavy losses. Dedicated torpedo- and dive-bombers
were quickly determined to be more effective, resulting in them being the preferred
aircraft types for such attacks for both the Imperial Japanese Naval Air Force (IJNAF)
and the US Navy.
A dive-bomber could hit a maneuvering ship, and it was a far harder target for
shipborne antiaircraft defenses to deal with than a medium bomber. A dive-bomber
attacking at 300 knots from 12,000ft would reach its drop point in only 20 seconds.
This made it challenging for antiaircraft defenses to react in time. Torpedo-bombing was
dangerous for the attacking aircraft since they had to approach the target at low attitude
and at low speed. But torpedoes were the only reliable way to sink large ships. The most
effective method when targeting a ship was a combined attack by both dive-bombers
and torpedo-bombers. This saturated its defenses and increased the likelihood of
inflicting damage since the target could not maneuver to avoid all forms of attack at once.
At the beginning of the Pacific War, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had the most
powerful naval air force in the world. Its ten aircraft carriers and 37 land-based air
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groups were equipped with 1,800 combat aircraft in total. In addition to its numerical
superiority over the US Navy’s carrier air groups, the IJNAF enjoyed a qualitative edge
in both aircraft and aircrew training and experience.
Japanese war plans depended on the striking power of the IJN’s air arm. Some 400
aircraft – the cream of the IJNAF – and their crews were embarked in carriers at the
heart of the Pearl Harbor Attack Force, which was slated to open the conflict with a
surprise attack on the US Navy’s Pacific Fleet at its Pearl Harbor base in Hawaii. This
was a supporting operation to the main Japanese offensive that was aimed at securing
the vital resources of Southeast Asia. The campaign against US forces in the Philippines,
the major concentration of British Commonwealth forces in Malaya, and the ill-
defended Dutch East Indies was supported by three small aircraft carriers and just over
400 aircraft of the 11th Air Fleet assigned to the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd Air Flotillas.
During the inter-war period, the US Navy was aware of the potential threat posed
by air attack. The nature of the threat posed by aircraft to ships at sea was constantly
changing, and the Americans understood the importance the IJN attached to its naval
air force. Nevertheless, in 1940, as the war in Europe raged, the US Navy was not fully
ready to deal with a modern air threat due to years of inter-war budget austerity that
had led to shortages in key equipment, especially light antiaircraft weapons.
Fortunately for the US Navy, it had the basis for quickly assembling a formidable system
for fleet air defense. Friendly fighters were always seen as the best method of defeating
enemy air attack, but these were not always
available or suffered from poor direction when
they were. Ships had to have the ability to defend
themselves from air attack. Because of its pre-war
design emphasis on shipboard air defense, the
US Navy had already fitted the excellent 5in./38
dual-purpose gun and the world-class Mark
(Mk) 37 fire control director on many ships. The
excellent 20mm Oerlikon cannon was also
coming into service, and the even better 40mm
Bofors gun would soon follow. With the right
doctrine and proper training, these tools would
coalesce into a system that eventually gutted the
finely-training pre-war IJNAF.
The Nakajima B5N Navy Type 97
Carrier Attack Bomber was the
best torpedo-bomber in the world
at the start of the Pacific War.
Combined with the formidable
Type 91 aerial torpedo, it gave the
IJNAF an unsurpassed ship-
killing capability. This particular
B5N2, from the 931st Kokutai,
was found at Saipan’s Aslito
airfield following the capture of
the island in July 1944. It was
returned to the United States and
flight-evaluated, after which the
aircraft was attached to a unit
known as “The Navy’s Flying
Might” that toured the country
taking part in nationwide Victory
Loan promotions. (Navy History
and Heritage Command – NHHC)
The outstanding antiaircraft
weapon of 1942 was the US
Navy’s 20mm automatic cannon.
In this photograph, taken during a
gunnery exercise, the weapon is
carried on a Mk 2 mounting with
an adjustable trunnion height.
The sailor on the far side of the
gun controls the trunnion height
with a large hand-wheel on the
side of the mount. (NHHC)
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