2008_RAND_Assessing-the-Tradecraft-of-Intelligence-Analysis_RAND_TR293.pdf

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Assessing the Tradecraft of
Intelligence Analysis
Gregory F. Treverton, C. Bryan Gabbard
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION
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Preface
Most public discussions of intelligence address operations—the work of spymasters and covert
operators. Current times, in the wake of September 11th and the intelligence failure in the run-
up to the war in Iraq, are different.
1
Intelligence
analysis
has become the subject. The Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission was direct, and damning, about intelligence analy-
sis before the Iraq war: “This failure was in large part the result of analytical shortcomings;
intelligence analysts were too wedded to their assumptions about Saddam’s intentions.”
2
To be
sure, in the Iraq case, what the United States did or did not collect, and how reliable its sources
were, were also at issue. And the focus of post mortems on pre-September 11th was, properly,
mainly on relations between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and on the way the FBI did its work. But in both cases, analysis was also
central. How do the various agencies perform the tradecraft of intelligence analysis, not just
of spying or operations? How is that task different now, in the world of terrorism, especially
Islamic Jihadist terrorism, than in the older world of the Cold War and the Soviet Union?
The difference is dramatic and that difference is the theme of this report. The United
States Government asked RAND to interview analysts at the agencies of the U.S. Intelligence
Community and ask about the current state of analysis. How do those analytic agencies think
of their task? In particular, what initiatives are they taking to build capacity, and what are
the implicit challenges on which those initiatives are based? Our charter was broad enough
to allow us to include speculations about the future of analysis, and this report includes those
speculations. This report is a work in progress because many issues—the state of tradecraft and
of training and the use of technology and formal methods—cry out for further study. This
report was long delayed in the clearance process. It has been updated and remains a useful
baseline in assessing progress as the Intelligence Community confronts the enormous chal-
lenges it faces.
in particular, the reports of the two national commissions that investigated the two failures. They are, respectively,
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004); and Final Report of the Commission on the
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (2005) (hereafter referred to as the
WMD Commission Report). The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was equally scathing about the October 2002
National Intelligence Estimate, concluding: “Most of the major key judgments . . . either overstated, or were not supported
by, the underlying intelligence reporting. A series of failures, particularly in analytic tradecraft, led to the mischaracteriza-
tion of the intelligence.” “Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq” (2004).
2
WMD
1
See,
Commission Report, p. 3.
iii

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