20190809-leaked-FBI-Strategy-Guide-FY2018-20-and-Threat-Guidance-for-Racial-Extremists.pdf

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UNCLASSIFIED//LES
FYlS
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Threat Guidance
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CTD
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Tf reat
lssue
Title
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Black
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Extremists
Quick Links
Dbmestic
Terrorsim
Fusion
Cell (DTAU
and
DTOTU)
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Blf
ck
Key
Domain
Entities
Kev
Liaison
Contacts
Kev
Threat lndicators
ldentity
Extremists
(8lEs) use
force or
violence
in
violation
of
criminal
law in response
to
p+ceived
racism and
injustice
in American society; some do so in
furtherance
of
establishing
a
s$arate
black
homeland
or
autonomous
black social
institutions, communities,
or
governing
o&anizations within the
US.A
desire
for
physical
or psychological separation
is
typically
based
on
a
refgious
or
political belief
system,
which
is
sometimes
formed around or
includes
a
belief
in racial
srferiority
or
supremacy.Retaliation and
retribution for
perceived
wrongdoings
against African
A{tericans
has
become an
organizing driver for
BlEs.Some
BlEs
desire separation
from perceived
odpressive forces (law
enforcement,
USG
personnel, and
other
oppressive forces
who
are
viewed
as
p{ticipants
in
this perceived unjust institutionalized
system).This
type
of
targeting
has
become
a
more
o{tainable
goal
for
BlEs.
Some
still
advocate
for
a
separate
homeland, while
some advocate
for starting
a
ColleGion Requirements
Case
Classificationt
CPI
Codes
Related Link5
Fce-war.
Overview
What is the
intended impoct?
(Ul
(U)
CfD will continue
to focus
on identifying national trends
and federal crimes
committed by
BlEs
to lower the intended threat impact
by
BlEs.
The
FBI
expects
field office work could mitigate and lower the national
level
extremist threat. Maintenance
of state
and
local
partnerships
combined
with
source
development could
result in
detection
and
prevention of
BIE
criminal activity. lt
is
challenging to get
sources
into
BIE
groups.
due to
s€curity measures these
groups
employ. The
vetting
process and
time investment
to gain
access
to
leadership
in
BIE
groups
is
very
lengthy.
The
use
of
undercover
employees
and online covert
employees in
BIE
investigations would provide valuable intelligence to
assist
in
mitigating the threat.
Whot
port of
the
threot
is
the
FBI
going
to
torget?
fiI//FOIJO)
(U//FOUO) The
FBIHQ
led Threat
Mitigation
Strategy
IRON
FIST
was
implemented to mitigate the potential threat
posed by
the
BIE
movement at
the national
level.
IRON
FlST
will accomplish
this by
identifying actionable inteiligence to directly support the initiation of
FBI
investigations
and
augment current efforts directed
against
BlEs.
IRON
FIST is
designed to
evolve and
adapt to the ever-changing threat
posed by
BlEs,
to proactively
address
this priority domestic terrorism target
by
focusing
FBI
operations
via
enhanced intelligence collection
efforts. ln
addition,
FBIHQ
works
to
develop potential
CHSs
and
conduct
assessments on
the current
BIE
CHS
base.
Many
BlEs
are
convicted
felons
who
are
prohibited
possessors,
therefore the
FBI
will continue to
use
their prohibited
possessor status
as
a
tactic
to
assist
in
mitigating
the
threat for potential violence.
What
informotion
does
the
FBI
need
to
know
in order
to
mitigate
the
threat?
fiJ//LES)
(U/ILES)
ln
order to mitigate the threat, the
FBI
must know who
facilitates and recruits
for
8lE
activity, what motivates
BlEs
to commit criminal
activities
in
furtherance of their political/social
goals and
what
tactics
BlEs
plan
to
use
in
the furtherance of their ideology.
The
FBI
needs
a
better
understanding
of
the
hierarchy
and structure of
BIE
groups,
and
how these
groups train/work
with
one
another,
and
criminal
organizations. The
FBI
needs
intelligence on individuals who
BIE
groups
had removed, asked
to
leave,
or
who left voluntarily
after expressing beliefs
deemed
too
extreme
for
the
established members of
the
BIE
group
since many
recent lethal
BIE
incidents
have been
conducted
by
BIE
lone offenders. To
mitigate the threat emanating
from
BlEs,
FBIHQ
entities conduct
an extensive review of
the program's
source
base,
which
is
published annually
in
the
National
Collection
Posture
and
Plan
(NCPP).
As
part of this review,
the
FBI
assesses
the national collection posture
and
capability
of
the
BIE
source
base
and
makes
a
determination
on
the
efficacy of
the program's collection platform, including appropriate
source
utilization and
areas
in
need
of
refocusing. ln
addition, the
FBI
highlights
salient
national collection
gaps
and provides recommendations
for
field
offices
to
address
those
gaps. Finally,
the
NCPP
emphasizes
current trends
within
the
threat
stream
that
and discusses ways in
which
these
trends
may
impact the
collection efforts.The information
taken
from the
NCPP is
then
used
to inform
5ource
ldentification
Guides, Source
Directed
Requirements,
Source
ldentification
Packages,
and others, all
to
ensure
the
FBI's
source
base
aligns
effectively
against
the
BIE
threat.
Whotactionswill
the
FBI
toke?
Field
Office
Actions
HQ Actions
(U/IFOUO) Field offices
will
focus
on
source
development,
awareness,
(U//FOUO) FBIHe
will continue to identiry and provide information on
and investigation
of
BIE
criminal activity
in
their
areas
of
responsibility.
national
threats and trends
to
FBI
executives and
field
offices,
as
well
as
state and local law
enforcement
partners, and
the
rest of
the
(U//Fouo)Field
offices
will
focus
on recruitment, fundraising for
activities,
and potential violent
plots.
illegal
intelligence community'
(U//FOUO)
FBIHQ
will
proactively
search
open
source
material
for
UNCLASSIFIED//LES
Data changes
s,nce
last
quarter
are
hrghlighted
rn
yellow.
Page
1
of4
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UNCLASSIFIED//LES
FYI8
CSG -
Threat Guidance
-
CTD
(U//FOUO) Field offices
will
focus on
the procurement of
illegal
weapons and explosives and
the procurement
of weapons and
explosives by
prohibited
persons
(U//FOUO) Field offices
will
evaluate
their
need
for
an
open Type
3
assessment
file
in regards
to
BlE.
An open assessment
file
allows
for
indicators of
BIE
activity, reporting relevant information to
the
field
for
possible
predication
or assessment of source
potential.
(U/lFOUOI
FBIHQ
will
provide timely
all-source analysis
of
BIE
activities
in
order to inform
FBI
executives and
field
offices of threats and
trends
in tactics and
targets.
greater proactive collection technigues should the
BIE
threat emerge
in
the
wake
of
a
police-involved incident that
spark
potential
BIE
activity.
UNCLASSIFIED/LES
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of4
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