D4.5 Surveillance the moral presumption of innocence.pdf

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FP7-­‐SEC-­‐2011-­‐284725  
 
 
SURVEILLE  
Surveillance:  Ethical  Issues,  Legal  Limitations,  and  Efficiency  
Collaborative  Project  
 
 
SURVEILLE  Deliverable  4.5:  Surveillance,  the  moral  presumption  of  innocence,  the  right  to  
be  free  from  criminal  stigmatisation  and  trust  
 
 
 
 
Due  date  of  deliverable:  30.09.2013  
Actual  submission  date:  30.09.2013  
 
Start  date  of  project:   1.2.2012  
 
 
 
Duration:  39  months  
SURVEILLE  Work  Package  number  and  lead:  WP04  Prof.  Martin  Scheinin  (EUI)  
Author:  Katerina  Hadjimatheou  (UW)  
 
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Table  of  Contents  
1. Introduction  
2. The  presumption  of  innocence  as  the  right  to  be  free  from  stigmatisation  
2.1 The  harms  of  stigmatisation  
2.2 Justifying  the  harms  of  stigmatisation  
2.2.1 Surveillance,  stigmatisation,  and  profiling  
2.2.2 Surveillance,  stigmatisation,  and  pre-­‐suspects  
3. The  presumption  of  innocence  and  trust  
3.1 Surveillance  and  the  right  to  be  trusted  
3.2 Trust,  preventive  surveillance,  and  the    burden  of  proof  
3.3 The  impact  of  surveillance  on  trust  as  a  social  good  
4. Conclusion  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Executive  Summary  
1. Surveillance  stigmatises  people  as  criminal  when  it  marks  people  out  as  potentially  
having  failed  to  uphold  or  being  thought  likely  to  fail  to  uphold  the  criminal  law.  
2. The  harms  of  being  stigmatised  as  criminally  suspicious  include:  humiliation;  
alienation  from  wider  community;  mistrust  of  and  reduced  willingness  to  cooperate  
with  surveilling  authorities;  reduced  security  for  society  as  a  result  of  this  reduced  
willingness  to  cooperate;  increased  risk  of  exposure  to  greater  risks  of  discrimination  
and  social  exclusion  by  others;  reduced  equality,  social  cohesion,  and  policing  
legitimacy  as  a  result  of  the  former  costs;  and  an  increased  risk  of  exposure  to  future  
measures  of  suspicion  by  police.  
3. The  most  stigmatising  surveillance  practices  are  those  that:  single  people  out  most  
visibly  for  scrutiny,  imply  the  strongest  suspicion  of  criminality,  connect  criminality  to  
salient  traits  (e.g.  ethnic  appearance)  and  apply  a  stigmatic  label  that  is  difficult  to  
remove  or  that  adheres  to  a  person  over  a  long  period  of  time.  
4. The  criminal  stigmatisation  caused  by  surveillance  is  disproportionate  when  it  is  
more  stigmatising  or  applies  a  stigmatic  label  for  longer  than  is  necessary  to  the  aims  
of  the  investigation.  
5. The  right  to  be  free  from  criminal  stigmatisation  is  violated  when  surveillance  
practices  impose  a  stigmatic  label  on  individuals  that  is  impervious  to  evidence  of  
innocence.    
6. Neither  the  use  of  profiling  nor  the  creation  of  pools  of  pre-­‐suspects  conflicts  in  
principle  with  the  right  to  be  free  from  stigmatisation,  though  some  actual  examples  
of  these  techniques  may  conflict  with  it  in  practice,  if  they  are  applied  
disproportionately.  
7. The  content  of  both  formal  and  informal  lists  of  pre-­‐suspects  should  be  responsive  to  
evidence  of  innocence  and  of  guilt.  Individuals  should  be  given  opportunities  to  
provide  such  evidence,  wherever  this  is  consistent  with  national  security  and  the  
pursuit  of  ongoing  investigations.  In  many  cases  it  is  appropriate  to  consider  a  lack  of  
further  evidence  of  guilt  tantamount  to  evidence  of  innocence  once  a  
predetermined  period  of  time  has  elapsed.  
8. Surveillance  does  not  impinge  upon  the  right  to  be  trusted  if  evidence  is  
proportionate  to  the  suspicion  inflicted  
or  
if  it  can  be  justified  most  convincingly  by  
appeal  to  reasons  other  than  the  untrustworthiness  of  those  surveilled;  when  these  
reasons  are  those  actually  given  in  practice  by  the  surveilling  authorities;  and  when  
the  policy  is  not  inconsistent  with  an  attitude  of  trust  towards  people  in  general.    
9. Surveillance  practices  undermine  trust  as  a  social  good  if  they  are  based  on  a  
presumption  that  people  in  general  are  untrustworthy,  if  they  exaggerate  though  
excessive  heavy-­‐handedness  the  untrustworthiness  of  particular  groups  of  people  
singled  out  as  suspicious,  or  if  they  draw  attention  to  the  presence  of  crime  too  
forcefully  so  that  people  begin  to  overestimate  the  threat  posed.  
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1.  Introduction  
Privacy  has  traditionally  been  the  core  value  thought  to  be  threatened  by  surveillance  
practices  (Warren  and  Brandeis,  1890;  Westin,  1967;  Jarvis-­‐Thomson,  1975).  In  recent  years,  
equality  and  norms  of  antidiscrimination  have  also  become  a  focus  of  concern  by  those  
examining  the  moral  costs  of  surveillance  (Lyon,  2002;  Bou-­‐Habib,  2008;  Ryberg,  2011).  
Today,  a  new  strand  of  critique  focuses  on  the  presumption  of  innocence,  which  is  thought  
to  be  the  latest  casualty  of  surveillance  practices.
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 This  deliverable  reviews  and  discusses  
this  third  line  of  critique;  it  examines  the  extent  to  which  different  surveillance  techniques  
might  undermine  the  presumption  of  innocence;  and  it  draws  on  this  analysis  to  reach  
conclusions  about  their  ethical  acceptability.  
Traditionally,  the  presumption  of  innocence  has  been  discussed  only  in  narrowly  legal  
discourse,  as  one  component  of  the  right  of  criminal  defendants  to  a  fair  trial.  But  this  is  not  
what  is  intended  by  ‘the  presumption  of  innocence’  as  it  often  appears  in  contemporary  
moral  and  political  debate  about  the  justifiability  of  surveillance  practices.  What  is  meant  
instead  is  something  like  a  right  
not  to  be  treated  as  criminally  suspicious  unless  one  has  
done  something  to  warrant  such  suspicion.  
This  moral  right  to  be  presumed  innocent  is  
conceived  as  applying  to  all  individuals  who  are  subject  to  criminal  suspicion  or  who  are  at  
risk  of  being  subject  to  criminal  suspicion.  Its  function  is  to  protect  people  from  being  
burdened  with  the  harms  of  criminal  suspicion  unfairly.    
This  movement  to  recognise  a  broader,  moral  right  to  be  presumed  innocent  has  been  
prompted  by  recent  developments  and  trends  in  police  practices.  Preventive  policing  
practices  including  surveillance  have  come  under  particular  criticism.  Sometimes  this  is  
because  they  appear  to  treat  with  suspicion  people  who  have  done  nothing  in  particular  to  
merit  such  suspicion.  Sometimes  it  is  because  they  appear  to  justify  such  treatment  on  the  
basis  of  evidence  that  is  weak  and  speculative.  Surveillance  techniques  which  have  been  
criticised  as  undermining  or  curtailing  the  moral  right  to  be  presumed  innocent  include  the  
mass  monitoring  of  electronic  communications  represented  by  the  US  National  Security  
Agency’s  PRISM  programme  (EU  Parliament,  2013
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);  the  use  in  the  UK  of  CCTV  cameras  to  
monitor  a  mainly  Muslim  residential  area  in  which  it  was  speculated  that  terrorist  sleepers  
may  be  operating  (Galetta,  2012:  280);  and  the  use  by  telecommunications  companies  of  
                                                                                                                       
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 See  in  list  of  references  Galetta  and  de  Hert  for  IRISS,  2012:  283-­‐291;  Pavone  for  PRISE,  2008:  22;  PACT,  
 As  reported  in  the  
Inquirer,  
in  July  2013  the  EU  Parliament  announced  the  launch  of  an  inquiry  into  the  
compatibility  of  PRISM  with  rights  including  the  presumption  of  innocence:  "The  Civil  Liberties  Committee  
inquiry  [will]  assess  the  impact  of  the  alleged  surveillance  activities  on  EU  citizens'  right  to  privacy  and  data  
protection,  freedom  of  expression,  the  presumption  of  innocence  and  the  right  to  an  effective  remedy,"  (EU  
Parliament  quoted  in  Inquirer,  9  July  2013  ‘European  Parliament  Votes  for  PRISM  Snooping  Investigation’.  At  
http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2280187/european-­‐parliament-­‐votes-­‐for-­‐prism-­‐snooping-­‐
investigation  
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DPI  (deep  packet  inspection)  techniques  to  detect  illegal  file-­‐sharing  (Fuchs,  2012:  50;  
Privacy  International,  2009).
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The  right  not  to  be  treated  as  suspicious  has  been  grounded  in  the  interests  people  have  in  
not  suffering  the  harms  of  being  stigmatised  as  criminal  or  potentially  criminal  (Campbell,  
2010).  It  has  also  been  grounded  in  a  moral  right  to  be  treated  as  trustworthy  (Nance,  1994;  
Duff,  forthcoming).  Some  critics  also  appeal  to  the  presumption  of  innocence  to  identify  and  
object  to  the  creation  of  an  ‘ethos  of  suspicion’  (Kimmelman,  2000)  or  an  erosion  of  the  
trust  that  forms  the  basis  of  social  relationships  in  a  liberal  society  (Lyon,  1994).  
Given  the  increasing  importance  given  in  current  debates  about  surveillance  practices  to  the  
presumption  of  innocence  broadly  understood,  and  given  also  the  fact  that  the  SURVEILLE  
project  has  not  as  yet  considered  of  such  practices  the  risk  to  this  particular  ethical  value,  
this  paper  makes  the  presumption  of  innocence  its  focus.  It  critically  examines  both  the  
stigmatisation  and  the  trust-­‐based  accounts  of  the  moral  presumption  of  innocence,  
drawing  on  academic  work  in  these  areas  to  reach  conclusions  about  the  ethical  risks  of  
specific  surveillance  techniques  and  practices.    
 
 
2.  The  presumption  of  innocence  as  the  right  to  be  free  from  stigmatisation  
Appeal  to  the  presumption  of  innocence  to  criticise  surveillance  practices  sometimes  implies  
a  right  to  not  be  stigmatised  as  criminally  suspicious.
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 Concerns  about  the  stigmatising  
effects  of  preventive  surveillance  practices  have  been  expressed  since  the  very  first  counter-­‐
terrorism  measures  were  taken  in  the  EU  and  USA  in  response  to  the  September  11  attacks  
of  2001.  For  example,  the  German  policy  of  data-­‐mining  for  and  surveillance  of  potential  
terrorist  sleepers  known  as  the  
Rasterfahndung  
was  struck  down  by  the  German  Federal  
Constitutional  Court  partly  on  the  ground  that  it  had  a  ‘stigmatising  effect’  on  those  singled  
out,  associating  them  unfairly  with  a  propensity  to  terrorist  crime.  The  court  argued  that  
this  imposed  harms  on  those  suspected  which  could  not  be  justified  on  the  basis  of  the  
evidence  (Breuwer  2009:23).  Concerns  about  the  stigmatising  effects  of  surveillance  have  
been  raised  most  strongly  in  connection  with  measures  that  single  people  out  on  the  basis  
of  their  ethnic  (including  racial  and  religious)  traits  (Bou-­‐Habib,  2011;  Ryman,  2011).  They  
have  also  been  expressed  in  relation  to  the  creation  of  pools  of  ‘pre-­‐suspects’  or  individuals  
who  are  thought  likely  to  become  suspects  in  a  police  investigation  in  the  future  (S  and  
Marper;  Campbell).  
 
2.1  Surveillance  and  the  harms  of  criminal  stigmatisation  
                                                                                                                       
 
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 See,  for  example,  ‘taint  of  suspicion’  (
S  and  Marper  
14)  resulting  from  inclusion  in  the  database  and  the  
implication  that  arrestees  were  ‘less  than  wholly  innocent’  (
S  and  Marper  
89).  
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