2005-01-31_SIDToday_-_Countering_Improvised_Explosive_Devices_in_Iraq.pdf

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DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
(U) Countering Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq
FROM: (C)
SSG Representative at CSG Baghdad, and
SSG Operations Orchestration
Run Date: 01/31/2005
New exploitation of High-Powered Cordless Phone Base Stations raises hopes that attackers can
be neutralized (S//SI)
(S//REL TO MCFI) The most potent weapon used by the insurgents in Iraq is the improvised
explosive device (IED). Because IEDs are often triggered from a distance with no discernable
enemy visible, these attacks are extremely frustrating to Coalition troops. In 2004, 822
American servicemen were either killed or wounded by IEDs.
(S//SI) Building on analysis done by Meade Operations Center's HPCP Analysis Cell (also known
as the HAC) and teaming with INSCOM's SIGINT Technical Development Activity (STDA),
TAREX* operators in theater developed a technique to quickly recover the security codes of
High-Powered Cordless Phones (HPCP) handsets. This procedure has reduced the time needed to
decode the HPCP security codes from weeks to a matter of hours, and in doing so, has opened a
new avenue to pursue IED triggermen and take the fight to them.
(S//REL TO MCFI) Many IED triggers within Iraq are HPCP handsets controlled from a common
base station. Recent HPCP models allow for the programming of as many as fifty handsets per
base station, allowing insurgents to use one base station as a trigger for numerous IEDs-a real
challenge to the SIGINT System.
(S//SI) Locating the IED triggermen is the first hard challenge with this technology. Finding the
base station's location is critical to determining the location of the triggermen, and identifying
the point of initiation. For SIGINT, this means trying to identify the security code or the "Base
Station Identification" (BSID) and locating that equipment for targeting. Handsets used as
triggers for the IEDs are often recovered; however, until recently, it was not possible to quickly
identify the BSID from these captured handsets.
(S//SI) The TAREX-Baghdad team realized the value of acquiring the BSID quickly to support
Geospatial analysis as well as assist with collection/tasking processes. They took on the
challenge of trying to use existing collection and processing equipment (PROPHET, SALVAGE,
and ALASKA) to extract the security codes, but without success. At this point, TAREX decided to
employ their laptop computers to record the digital wave files directly, using the "Sound
Recorder" program. Hooking the XPLORER test receiver directly into the laptop's microphone
jack, then tuning to the handset's 228.74 megahertz broadcast frequency, the TAREX staff was
able to broadcast and record a series of on-off sequences. Since audible beeps were heard only
when keying the handset transmitter on and off, these segments were most likely the security
code. TAREX then sent this recorded file to INSCOM STDA and the HAC. Several days later, the
HAC (Mr.
) informed TAREX that the files were of sufficient quality to allow a
breakout of the security codes they contained.
(TS//SI) As a result of TAREX's ability to send the recorded wave files, the HAC developed and
standardized a MARTES Software method for processing these new input files. These MARTES
methods can easily determine the keying rate, coding scheme, center frequency, signal fielding,
service signal identification, mode/function and-when possible-the BSID of the captured phone
(either handset or base station).
(TS//SI) To take this success one step further, when an intercepted signal is known and the
security code (BSID) is recovered, the HAC forwards an immediate turn-around report to the
TAREX report originator, as well as collection and analysis resources (Overhead, Airborne, and
Ground-based assets) for special emphasis targeting. If the service signal is unknown, as was
the case recently, a new signal report (HILITE) is issued, the structure is outlined on the HAC
web site, and developers can create a processing algorithm for the OOK HPCP service signal.
(TS//SI) With the ability to quickly identify the BSIDs directly from the handsets, the base
stations -- and hence the IED triggermen -- can be targeted. As a result of the vital work
conducted by operators of the TAREX-Baghdad team, INSCOM STDA, and the HAC, a principal
component in many IEDs can now be targeted and hopefully, the IED makers neutralized. The
effects of this work will be counted in the lives saved.
(C) The following contributed to this article:
SSG
IMPACT Science and Technology
USA, TAREX Representive to MNF/C-I Baghdad
Functional Engineer/Analyst, IFC/IDC Baghdad
*Note:
(C) TAREX, or Target Exploitation, is a unique collection program chartered under USSID 173 to
collect information and documentation of interest to the U.S. Cryptologic System.
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108

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